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ABSTRACT
Corporate governance discussions in Europe on shareholders’ rights have increas-
ingly been replaced by discussions on shareholders’ duties. This trend is reflected 
in company and capital markets law, where shareholders increasingly are imposed 
duties towards investee companies. For example, the legalization of shareholders’ 
duties was a key element in the EU Commission’s amendment to the Shareholder 
Rights Directive in 2017 (Directive 2017/828). A key to this transformation is share-
holder accountability, in particular in relation the share ownership of institutional 
investors. Thus, the transformation bodes a break with an embedded perception ac-
cording to which the relationship between shareholders and the investee company re-
flects a private ordering at the center of the European corporate governance model. 
The increased focus on shareholder accountability emphasizes the societal aspect of 
share ownership and, more generally, the interest that society holds in public limited 
liability companies. On the basis of a discussion of the amended Shareholder Rights 
Directive and the possible implications of this transformation, the paper concludes 
is that it is questionable whether shareholders can serve as a reliable vehicle for 
transformation of company law towards a more sustainable framework.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance discussions in Europe on shareholder rights have in-
creasingly been replaced by discussions of shareholder duties.1 This trend is 
reflected in company law and capital markets law, where shareholders increas-
ingly are imposed duties towards investee companies, other shareholders and 
market participants. Previous research has analyzed a variety of duties im-
posed on shareholders.2 These duties show great variety as well as variance 
across Member States in the EU. The discussion of shareholder duties gained 
momentum after the financial crisis, and questions related to appropriate roles 
for shareholders in internal corporate governance received special scrutiny. 
The EU corporate governance framework has at all times emphasized the im-
portance of shareholder engagement, and previous legislative initiatives have 
strengthened shareholder rights in order to spur shareholder involvement in 
corporate governance. However, weaknesses in the EU corporate governance 
framework became evident during the financial crisis,3 and European as well 
as national legislators faced pressure to react to the financial markets’ collapse. 
Consequently, not only were the discussions about shareholder rights in cor-
porate governance gradually supplemented with discussions about sharehold-
er duties, but legislative action also reinforced shareholder duties in corpo-
rate governance through new provisions in company law. Probably the most 
prominent example of such shareholder oriented post-crisis regulation is the 
EU Commission’s amendment to the Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II), 
which was adopted in 2017 (Directive 2017/828), and shareholder duties was a 
novel element. This marks a break with the traditional perception in company 
law that shareholders have no duties when they invest in companies. More-
over, it also bodes a break with an embedded perception according to which 
the relationship between shareholders and the investee company is a private 
ordering. The provisions on shareholder engagement found in SRD II suggest 
1 Shareholder duties is the topic of a research project based at Aarhus University from 2014–
2018. This research project received financial support from the Danish Council for Indepen-
dent Research. The author would like to thank the Council for their financial support. The 
work on this paper is also carried out as part of the research project ‘Social Interest and Cor-
porate Governance Balance: Shareholders’ Duties and Managers’ Duties’, which is supported 
by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness.
2 For a mapping of these duties, see Birkmose, H. S. and Möslein, F.: Introduction: Mapping 
shareholders’ duties, in: Birkmose, H. S. (ed.): Shareholders’ Duties, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
2017, pp. 1–25. 
3 See Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies, Green 
Paper, (COM(2010) 284 final), and EU Corporate Governance Framework, Green Paper, 
(COM(2011) 164 final). 
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that shareholders should be accountable to other company constituents when 
exercising their shareholder rights, thus emphasizing a societal aspect of share 
ownership that previously has not been dominant. 
Therefore, SRD II can be seen as an indication of a transformation of company 
law. Status quo is not considered an option in a post-crisis perspective, and 
a transformation is needed to set a new direction for corporate governance 
practices. A transformation of company law involves an extensive and radical 
change that orients companies and their shareholders in a new direction. 
One of the overarching objectives of SRD II is to contribute to the long-term 
sustainability of EU companies.4 Sustainable development has become an in-
tegrated aim of the accomplishment of the internal market.5 In relation to the 
Commission’s Action Plan on Financing of Sustainable Growth, sustainable 
finance concerns ‘improving the contribution of finance to sustainable and in-
clusive growth  by  funding  society’s  long-term  needs, and strengthening 
financial  stability  by  incorporating environmental,  social  and  governance 
(ESG)  factors  into  investment  decision-making.’6 Even though SRD II does 
not define sustainability, the documents that preceded the Directive highlight 
the emphasis on short-term gains by some companies and shareholders as in-
compatible with sustainable development.7 In relation to this article, it is suf-
ficient to understand sustainability as a broad term that encompasses three 
dimensions, each of which is important to a company’s activities: economic 
development, social development and environmental protection. Providing in-
centives for companies to take these dimensions seriously will also intensify 
their focus on long-term company practices, which is considered an inherent 
part of sustainability.  
4 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of 
long term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of 
the corporate governance statement (COM(2014) 213 final), Section 1.
5 See for example the preamble of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 
(‘TEU’), 2016/C 202/01, Communication From the Commission, Europe 2020, A strategy for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final and Communication From The 
Commission to The European Parliament, The European Council, The Council, The European 
Central Bank, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of The 
Regions. Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, COM(2018) 97 final. 
6 Communication From The Commission to The European Parliament, The European 
Council, The Council, The European Central Bank, The European Economic and Social Com-
mittee and The Committee of The Regions. Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, p. 1, 
COM(2018) 97 final. 
7 E.g. the 2010 Green Paper, Section 3.5 and the 2011 Green Paper, introduction and Sec-
tions 1.4 and 2.2.
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The purpose of this article is to assess the extent to which shareholder duties 
can be an effective vehicle to ensure sustainable, long-term oriented corporate 
governance. In short, I am skeptical about the ability of SRD II, on its own, 
to provide sufficient momentum and for shareholder duties in general to be an 
appropriate vehicle for a transformation of corporate governance that is polit-
ically driven from above.
The article begins with a discussion of shareholder duties in Section 2, and ex-
plains why shareholders have become the center of regulatory attention even 
though shareholders are just one interest group among many in a company’s 
sphere. Moreover, this section focuses on situations where we could expect du-
ties to be imposed on shareholders. The rights shareholders are given in com-
pany law are closely integrated with the corporate governance duties we find in 
both company and capital market law. Section 2.1 explores this connection and 
unfolds some the most important governance duties. The amended Sharehold-
er Rights Directive takes corporate governance duties to a new level, and the 
emerging engagement duties found in the directive are discussed in Section 3 
in order to determine not only the content of the duties, but also their aim. The 
latter is important because the aim seems to go beyond the prevalent understand-
ing of appropriate shareholder monitoring in corporate governance, which raises 
the question of whether SRD II requirements are likely to compel shareholders 
to embrace a more prominent role in corporate governance and, if so, if we 
can expect that role be used to promote a more sustainable, long-term corporate 
agenda. This discussion, the focus of Section 4, concludes that is questionable 
whether SRD II will be sufficient to induce the institutional investors to make 
significant changes to their engagement practices. Consequently, the effects re-
alized may depend on how efficiently the provisions are enforced, and Section 5 
takes up this important question. Finally, I sum up the discussions in Section 6 
and point to some of the questions that legislators need to consider if shareholder 
duties are to become a reliable vehicle for transformation of corporate gover-
nance towards a more sustainable framework. Section 7 concludes.
2. WHY SHAREHOLDERS? 
Shareholders, creditors and employees all have an intense and focused interest 
in corporate behavior. However, EU legislation has mandated the performance 
of specific, politically-oriented functions by shareholders and shareholders 
alone, and not by the other groups. It is therefore relevant to start out by con-
sidering, why shareholders have become the center of attention. 
The simple answer is that shareholders have a unique position in company law 
and in corporate governance. Contrary to other groups of company constitu-
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ents, company law across Member States grants shareholders a number of fun-
damental rights that are exclusive to this group.8 Notable among these are the 
right to receive a dividend, the right to the return of surplus capital on winding 
up the company, and the right to vote at the general meeting.9 Other rights 
include the right to speak at the general meeting, to table resolutions and to 
call an extraordinary meeting. These rights are protected by company law and 
resemble proprietary rights to some extent,10 even though shareholders do not 
own the company or the company assets, but only the shares of the company.11 
While share ownership carries certain rights, the general perception has been 
that share ownership, in itself, does not entail any duties for shareholders. Nor 
do we find that the proprietary rights derived from share ownership entail any 
duties in general.12 Moreover, shareholders have been considered to be free to 
choose whether or not to exercise the rights they have been given,13 and they 
are not obliged to do so.14 
8 Pennington, R.: Company Law, London, 2001, pp. 160–1; Worthington, S.: Shares and 
Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement: Part 1, Company Lawyer, 22(9) 2001, p. 260 
f.; Davies, P. L.: Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law, London, 2001, pp. 817 ff.; and 
Ireland, P.: Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, Modern Law Review, 
62(1) 1999, p. 46 f.
9 Bird, H.: A Critique of the Proprietary Nature of Share Rights in Australian Public Listed 
Corporations, Melbourne University Law Review, 22, 1998, p. 137.
10 Chiu, I. H.-Y.: The Meaning of Share Ownership and The Governance Role of Sharehold-
er Activism in The United Kingdom, Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business, vol. 8, 
2008–2009, pp. 121 ff.
11 Worthington, S.: Shares and Shareholders op cit note 8, p. 259; Demsetz, H.: Toward a 
Theory of Property Rights, American Economic Review 57(2) 1967, p. 359; Stein, P & Shand, 
J.: Legal Values in Western Society, New York, 1974, p. 220; Ireland, P.: Company Law op. 
cit. note 8.; Davies, P.L.: Gower’s Principles op. cit. note 8, p. 815, which refers to Short v. 
Treasury Commissioners (1948) 1 K.B. 122, C.A.; and Deakin, S.: The Corporation as Com-
mons: Rethinking Property Rights, Governance and Sustainability in the Business Enterprise, 
Queen’s Law Journal, vol. 37, 2012, p. 355 f..
12 Birkmose, H. S.: Forcing Shareholder Engagement: Theoretical Underpinning and Polit-
ical Ambitions, European Business Law Review, 29(4) 2018, p. 633.
13 See among others Barker, R. M. & Chiu, I. H.-Y.: Corporate Governance and Investment 
Management, London, 2017, p. 165; and Birkmose, H. S.: European Challenges for Institu-
tional Investor Engagement – is mandatory disclosure the way forward? European Company 
and Finance Law Review, vol. 11 2014, pp. 225 ff.
14 See Sørensen, K.E.: Duty of loyalty for shareholders – a possible remedy for conflicts in 
SME’s, in: Neville, M. & Sørensen, K. E. (eds.), Company Law and SMEs, Copenhagen, 2009, 
pp. 128 ff. However, some jurisdictions may impose a fiduciary duty on shareholders, see 
Cahn, A.: The Shareholders’ Fiduciary Duty in German Company Law, in: Birkmose, H. S.: 
(ed.), Shareholders’ Duties, Chapter 16.
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Shareholder rights were at the core of the 2007 Shareholder Rights Direc-
tive.15 The purpose of this directive was to enhance shareholder rights in listed 
companies, to facilitate and encourage shareholder engagement and to solve 
problems related to cross-border voting.16 
The rights granted to shareholders in company law, and emphasized with the 
adoption of the Shareholder Rights Directive, are fundamental to the European 
corporate governance model. The Commission has increasingly emphasized 
the role of shareholders in corporate governance. In the 2012 Action Plan, the 
Commission stated that ‘effective, sustainable shareholder engagement is one 
of the cornerstones of listed companies’ corporate governance model’.17 The 
Commission has also stated that the corporate governance framework is ‘built 
on the assumption that shareholders engage with companies and hold the man-
agement to account for its performance’18 and that shareholders have a crucial 
role to play in promoting better governance of companies. By doing this they 
act in both the interest of the company and their own interest.’19 Consequently, 
by monitoring corporate decisions, shareholders play an important role in the 
checks and balances of company management. However, to understand the 
role of shareholders in corporate governance, we must look not only to com-
pany law, but also to the economic theories behind the European corporate 
governance framework – and in particular at the agency relationship between 
the shareholders and the board of directors.20 
In a corporate governance perspective, principal-agent theory most commonly 
focuses on the relationship between the information-rich board of directors 
(the agent) and the company’s shareholders (the principal), whose interests the 
board ostensibly serve.21 Here, shareholder rights are important as part of a 
15 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies.
16 See Recitals 1 and 3, Directive 2007/36/EC.
17 European Company Law and Corporate Governance – A modern legal framework for 
more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, (COM(2012) 740 final), section 3.
18 The EU Corporate Governance Framework, Green Paper, (COM(2011) 164 final), intro-
ductory remarks.
19 European Company Law and Corporate Governance – A modern legal framework for 
more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, (COM(2012) 740 final), section 1.
20 See in particular Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H.: Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4) 1976; 
Fama, E. & Jensen, M.: Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics 
26 (2) 1983. 
21 Armour, J., Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R.: Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in: 
Kraakman, R. et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional 
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legal governance strategy to enable the principal to control the agent’s behav-
ior.22 By contrast, in an agency relationship, duties are primarily relevant to 
legal regulatory strategies that aim to constrain the agent in ways that ensure 
protection of the interests of the principal. In the agency relationship between 
the shareholders and the board of directors, the shareholder is the principal. 
Consequently, agency theory explains the focus on shareholder rights in corpo-
rate governance, but it does not explain why duties are imposed on the share-
holders, as they are the principals. However, shareholders can be understood 
as the principals in two other relationships: 23 those with company customers, 
creditors and employees and, importantly, with other shareholders.24 
In all agency relationships, information asymmetries may lead to suboptimal 
outcomes, and disclosure can be an important means to offset an agent’s po-
tential information advantage. This is discussed further in Section 2.1, be-
low. However, asymmetric information and conflicts of interest not only occur 
among company constituents. Such conflicts of interest, so-called external-
ities, sometimes rise between the company and non-contractual parties.25 
Shareholder duties may also be imposed to address externalities in situations 
where shareholders are in a position to cause market failure, as for example 
when they engage in market activities on the basis of private information
To sum up, shareholders have become the center of attention partly because 
of their unique position in company law and in internal corporate governance, 
due to the control rights they are granted in company law. Still, even though 
corporate governance theory stresses the importance of shareholder monitor-
ing, the economic theories on which the corporate governance framework is 
built do not support the notion that shareholders have duties related to the 
companies in which they invest.26 Nonetheless, if we look to other important 
Approach, Oxford, 2017, p. 29 f., where three different agency problems in a company are 
defined. 
22 For a discussion on ’regulatory strategies’ in relation to agency relationships, see Armour, 
J., Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R.: Agency Problems, op. cit. note 21, pp. 31 ff. See also Birk-
mose, H. S.: Duties Imposed on Specific Shareholders Only, and Enforcement Implications, 
in: Birkmose, H. S. & Sergakis, K. (eds.): Enforcing Shareholders’ Duties, London, 2018, 
(forthcoming).
23 Armour, J., Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R.: Agency Problems, op. cit. note 21, p. 30.
24 See Birkmose, H. S.: Duties Imposed on Specific Shareholders, op. cit. note 22, p. (forth-
coming).
25 Externalities describe the cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur 
that cost or benefit. This might be the result of a market failure. See Armour, J., Hansmann, H., 
& Kraakman, R.: Agency Problems, op. cit. note 21, p. 30.
26 Birkmose, H. S.: Forcing Shareholder Engagement, op. cit. note 12, pp. 616ff.
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agency relationships in companies, where shareholders act as the agents of oth-
er company constituents, we can understand that shareholder duties might be 
best understood as being part of a legal strategy to deal with conflicts of inter-
est and asymmetric information. Such an explanation, however, sidesteps the 
question of why SRD II has a particular focus on the duties of a specific subset 
of shareholders: institutional investors.27 This puzzle is discussed in Section 3.
2.1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DUTIES
As discussed above, the European corporate governance model emphasizes 
the involvement of shareholders in the checks and balances of the board of 
directors. Here asymmetric information is an inherent problem because the 
board of directors may have an information advantage. But it is also possible 
that the majority shareholder, who might wish to influence the company, has 
an information advantage over minority shareholders. As discussed above, a 
legal strategy for controlling agency costs is to facilitate the principal’s control 
over their agents’ behavior.28 The efficacy of such a strategy depends highly 
on the ability of the principal to exercise its control rights. In this respect, 
disclosure duties imposed on the agent are an important auxiliary mechanism, 
as it evens out the information advantage the agent may have and it allows the 
principal to assess the actions of the agent.29 Thus, disclosure duties are also 
an important auxiliary mechanism to the governance strategies pursued by 
company law in which shareholder rights are at the core.30 Outside the inherent 
agency relationships in companies, asymmetric information may be problem-
atic in relation to externalities, which is why informing the market and market 
participants via mandated disclosures could be a key to ensuring an efficient 
capital market.31
Consequently, disclosure duties are found in company law as well as in capital 
market law. While it may not be surprising that corporate governance duties 
are found in company law, as ensuring good corporate governance is an essen-
tial part of the company law framework, it may be more surprising that corpo-
rate governance related duties are also found in capital market law. 
27 In broad terms, the provisions in SRD II only apply to undertakings carrying out activities 
of life assurance or institutions for occupational retirement provision and asset managers. See 
SRD II, Article 2.
28 Armour, J., Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R.: Agency Problems, op. cit. note 21, p. 31 f.
29 Ibid, p. 32.
30 Ibid, pp. 31 ff. 
31 Sørensen, K. E.: Shareholders’ Duty to Disclose, in: Birkmose, H. S.: (ed.), Shareholders’ 
Duties, p. 308.
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Company law is intended to reduce the costs of transactions that take place 
within a business form with certain characteristics rather than within a market 
per se.32 Organizing a business through the corporate form, involves a risk 
that company constituents33 – including shareholders, the board of directors, 
creditors and employees – engage in opportunistic behavior, or that conflicts 
of interest occur. Therefore, the regulatory framework seeks to constrain val-
ue-reducing forms of opportunism and to control conflicts of interest. 
The aims of capital market law are different from those of company law. The 
contractual relationship between market participants is of less importance here, 
as a primary aim is to ensure the existence of efficient capital markets. More-
over, capital market law also serves an important public interest function, in the 
sense that the state has a clear interest in the well-being of capital markets, an 
interest that goes beyond advancing the private interests of individual market 
participants. Thus, protecting against market failures, including those caused by 
asymmetric information, is a main focus in capital market law. However, the dis-
closure rules found in capital market law go beyond market efficiency; a number 
of these duties are also intended to enhance good corporate governance.34 
The corporate governance duties found in the law serve several purposes, with 
most falling into one of two categories of disclosure duties.35 They serve either 
to provide information about ownership or control structures of a company, or 
to ensure transparency about a shareholder’s intentions. That is, the law seeks 
to make transparent the ways influence has been or will be exercised. 
Because corporate governance duties aim to promote better corporate gov-
ernance, most disclosure duties only apply to specific shareholders or groups 
of shareholders who have the potential to exercise significant (negative) influ-
ence on a company. For example, shareholders often must disclose holdings 
of a certain size, or certain defined relationships to the company, e.g. if the 
shareholder is also a director.36 This is consistent with the discussion above, as 
these shareholders either have a majority holding (and thus act as agents of the 
minority), or may be able to cause a market failure due to the information their 
position in the company may provide access to.
While corporate governance issues concern all limited liability companies, 
some of the duties apply only to shareholders in listed companies. This is un-
32 See Armour, J. et al., ‘What Is Corporate Law?’, in: Kraakman, R. et al. (eds.), The Anat-
omy, op. cit. note 21, p. 1 f...
33 Ibid. p. 2 f.
34 For a thorough discussion, see Sørensen, K. E.: Shareholders’ Duty to Disclose, op. cit. 
note 31, p. 311–20.
35 Sørensen, K. E.: Shareholders’ Duty to Disclose, op. cit. note 31, pp. 311–20.
36 See Birkmose, H. S.: Duties Imposed on Specific Shareholders, op. cit. note 22, (forthcoming). 
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surprising with regard to duties found in capital market law, but shareholders 
in listed companies are also subjected to duties in company law, in particu-
lar those found in SRD II.37 While listed companies are more likely to have 
cross-border elements and therefore are more prone to EU regulation, also in 
the area of company law, it is more surprising that these duties apply only to 
some institutional investors, a scope that hardly can be explained by agency 
theory or fears of market failure.38 
3. SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
The shareholder engagement provisions in SRD II take corporate governance 
a step further than previous attempts to encourage shareholders to take a more 
proactive role in investee companies. The question of appropriate shareholder 
engagement, an emerging corporate governance discussion, takes its starting 
point in the rights granted to holders of shares in limited liability companies. 
These control and governance rights are an inherent part of share ownership, 
as discussed above.39 The EU Commission has for years emphasized the im-
portance of shareholder rights, and the adoption of the Shareholder Rights Di-
rective40 in 2007 was an important measure to strengthen the rights of share-
holders across Member States.
The strengthening of shareholders rights is important for shareholders who 
want to engage in the governance of investee companies. Traditionally, the 
corporate governance agenda has been regarded as optional for shareholders, 
and shareholders had been free to choose to exercise their given rights or to 
remain passive. However, a new agenda is emerging, whereby the traditional 
engagement agenda that relies primarily on shareholder rights is coupled with 
disclosure duties for institutional investors and asset managers that aim to in-
crease long-term, sustainable shareholder engagement. This new agenda has 
materialized with SRD II, which was adopted in 2017.41
37 In broad terms, the provisions in SRD II only apply to undertakings carrying out activities 
of life assurance or institutions for occupational retirement provision and asset managers. See 
SRD II, Article 2.
38 See Birkmose, H. S.: Duties Imposed on Specific Shareholders, op. cit. note 22, (forthcoming).
39 ‘What Is Corporate Law?’ in: Kraakman, R. et al. (eds.), The Anatomy, op. cit. note 21, pp. 
11 ff. 
40 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies.
41 Directive (EU) 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder en-
gagement.
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3.1. THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE
The amended Shareholder Rights Directive was born in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis, when national and supranational regulators were un-
der pressure to react to the malpractices of market participants, including the 
shareholders, after the financial markets’ collapse. In the 2010 and 2011 Green 
Papers, the EU Commission stressed that the lack of shareholder engagement 
might have contributed to the extensive consequences of the crisis.42 Trust in 
shareholders had been shaken during the financial crisis, and the Commission 
argued that the observed passivity of shareholders raised ‘questions about the 
effectiveness of corporate governance rules based on the presumption of ef-
fective control by shareholders.’43 Still, despite this criticism of a system that 
relied on the idea that a shareholder would engage and hold management to 
account for its performance, the Commission continued to rely on shareholder 
engagement as ‘one of the cornerstones of listed companies’ corporate gov-
ernance model’.44 Thus, the Commission stated in its 2012 Action Plan that it 
would propose an initiative on the disclosure of institutional investors’ voting 
and engagement policies as well as their voting records, all in an effort to im-
prove transparency on investor practices and improve corporate governance in 
listed companies.45 The Commission put forward a proposal for an amendment 
of the Shareholder Rights Directive in April 201446 and, after some adjust-
ments during the negotiations in the European Parliament, the SRD II was 
adopted three years later, in April 2017. 
The SRD II includes a Chapter 1b on the transparency required of institutional 
investors, asset managers and proxy advisors. Of particular interest in this 
chapter is Article 3g, titled ‘Engagement Policy’. Paragraph 1 states: 
Member States shall ensure that institutional investors and asset managers ei-
ther comply with the requirements set out in points (a) and (b) or publicly 
disclose a clear and reasoned explanation why they have chosen not to comply 
with one or more of those requirements.
42 See Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies, 
(COM(2010) 284 final), section 3.5 (hereinafter the ‘2010 Green Paper’); and The EU cor-
porate governance framework (COM(2011) 164 final), section 2 (hereinafter the ‘2011 Green 
Paper’).
43 The 2010 Green Paper, section 3.5.
44 The 2012 Action Plan (COM(2012) 740 final), section 3.
45 See the 2012 Action Plan (COM(2012) 740 final), section 2.4.
46 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate governance statement. COM(2014) 
213 final.
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Typesetter: please indent the following two quoted paragraphs, so that they 
are shown clearly as sub-paragraphs to the quoted paragraph immediately 
above
(a) Institutional investors and asset managers shall develop and publicly dis-
close an engagement policy that describes how they integrate sharehold-
er engagement in their investment strategy. The policy shall describe how 
they monitor investee companies on relevant matters, including strategy, 
financial and non-financial performance and risk, capital structure, social 
and environmental impact and corporate governance, conduct dialogues 
with investee companies, exercise voting rights and other rights attached 
to shares, cooperate with other shareholders, communicate with relevant 
stakeholders of the investee companies and manage actual and potential 
conflicts of interests in relation to their engagement.
(b) Institutional investors and asset managers shall, on an annual basis, public-
ly disclose how their engagement policy has been implemented, including 
a general description of voting behavior, an explanation of the most signifi-
cant votes and the use of the services of proxy advisors. They shall publicly 
disclose how they have cast votes in the general meetings of companies in 
which they hold shares. Such disclosure may exclude votes that are insig-
nificant due to the subject matter of the vote or the size of the holding in the 
company.
3.2. AIM OF THE DIRECTIVE
From the text it is clear that the primary aim of Article 3g is to ensure public 
disclosure of institutional investors’ and asset managers’ investment strategies, 
their engagement policy and the implementation thereof.47 Alternatively, insti-
tutional investors and asset managers may disclose an explanation as to why 
they have chosen not comply with the provisions (comply or explain). Engage-
ment with investee companies is part of a legal governance strategy under 
which shareholders actively assert their control over the board of directors. 
However, as discussed above in Section 2, we would not expect any duties to 
be imposed on the shareholders in their role as principal vis-à-vis the board 
of directors, as governance strategies aim to facilitate the principal’s ability to 
control the agent’s behavior. It is thus more reasonable to understand disclo-
sure duties like those found in Article 3g as mechanisms to assist efforts by an 
institutional investor’s own principals to control their agent – the institutional 
47 See also Barker, R. M. & Chiu, I. H.-Y.: Corporate Governance and Investment Manage-
ment, London, 2017, p. 182 f.
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investor. Nothing in SRD II challenges this interpretation. However, a closer 
look at the preamble of the SRD II suggests that the aim goes beyond enhanc-
ing corporate governance as traditionally understood. Recital 16 states that
…. Public disclosure of such information could have a positive impact on in-
vestor awareness, enable ultimate beneficiaries such as future pensioners to 
optimize investment decisions, facilitate the dialogue between companies and 
their shareholders, encourage shareholder engagement and strengthen their ac-
countability to stakeholders and to civil society.
Arguably, the purpose is not fully clear from the wording of this recital. From 
a corporate governance perspective, all shareholders have a financial interest 
in monitoring the board. However, the SRD II limits the disclosure duties to 
institutional investors and asset managers.48 An argument that supports this 
emphasis on institutional investors and asset managers is that this type of 
shareholder has a long-term commitment to its own principals: their benefi-
ciaries.49 Since these beneficiaries, for example investors in pension schemes, 
are interested in the size of their return many years down the road, they expect 
their fund managers, for example pension fund managers, to use their share-
holder power to encourage a similarly long-term focus by investee companies. 
Disclosure by the institutional investors would be consistent with a governance 
strategy that enables the principal (the beneficiaries) to control their agent (the 
institutional investor). While institutional investors undoubtedly are agents of 
their beneficiaries, this agency relationship has usually not been regulated in 
company law, though. 
In addition to protecting the interests of these beneficiaries, the disclosure 
of the information in Article 3g seems to aim at ensuring the interests of a 
number of other company interest groups, including other investors and the 
investee companies themselves. If an institutional investor is the majority 
shareholder, then its actions can affect the interests of minority shareholders. 
But if such minority interests should be protected, then surely they should be 
protected with reference to all majority shareholders and not only institutional 
investors. Further, this argument does not take into consideration the range 
in size and investment strategies among members of the institutional investor 
‘group’. While it can be argued that duties should be imposed on institutional 
investors when they are in a position to cause market failure due to asymmetric 
48 Moreover, only a subset of the institutional investor population is covered by the provisions 
in Chapter 1b, supra n. 27.
49 EU Corporate Governance Framework, Green Paper, (COM(2011) 164 final), section 2.1. 
See also Fairfax, L. M.: Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, Ohio State 
law Journal, vol. 69 2008, p. 83.
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information, it can hardly be argued that institutional investors per se can be 
expected to be a unique cause of market failure. 
While the disclosure duties in Article 3g cannot be seen strictly as an engage-
ment duty, due to the flexible ‘comply or explain’ approach, the article con-
tains some very detailed expectations for institutional investors’ engagement 
with investee companies. These duties may be seen as implicit engagement 
duties.50 Engagement expectations, built seem to go beyond the monitoring 
of the boards, which traditionally underlies the agency relationship between 
shareholders and the board of directors. This relationship builds on the prem-
ise that shareholders have a financial incentive to monitor the boards of direc-
tors to ensure that the value of their investment is maximized.51 Emphasizing 
an expectation for institutional investors to include in their engagement policy 
how they monitor investee companies on issues such as ‘strategy, financial 
and non-financial performance and risk, capital structure, social and environ-
mental impact and corporate governance’ and how they ‘communicate with 
relevant stakeholders of the investee companies’ suggests that institutional 
investors are expected to include interests that go beyond their own private 
interest. Looking at Recital 16 again, it mentions that disclosure of the re-
quired information should ‘strengthen their accountability to stakeholders and 
to civil society.’ It is not quite clear who ‘their’ refers to. However, in the 2012 
Action Plan an almost identical wording is seen in Section 2.4. Here it is said 
that disclosure ‘could strengthen companies’ accountability to civil society.’52 
This might even suggest that institutional investors should be watchdogs on 
behalf of civil society’s interests in listed companies.53 Undoubtedly, civil so-
ciety has an interest in the financial well-being of companies, but the extent 
of accountability owed by shareholders to civil society is arguable even after 
implantation of SDR II. The traditional division of power in limited liability 
companies limits the shareholders’ role to controlling the board and leaves the 
board of directors as responsible for ensuring compliance of its company with 
any duties associated with the service of broader public interests. In addition, 
50 See also Chiu, I. H.-Y. & Katelouzou, D., who in their paper, From Shareholder Steward-
ship to Shareholder Duties: Is the Time Ripe? argue that the SRD II is a tentative step towards 
a hardening of engagement duties. In: Birkmose, H. S.: (ed.), Shareholders’ Duties, § 7.04.
51 See among others Fama, E. & Jensen, M.: Separation of Ownership and Control, op. cit. 
note 20; Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H.: Theory of the Firm, op. cit. note 20. 
52 European Company Law and Corporate Governance – A modern legal framework for 
more engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, (COM(2012) 740 final). 
53 The trend where the impact of listed companies on society and the overall economy be-
comes the focus of increased public attention has been labelled ‘publicness’. See Fisch, J. E., 
The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment, University of Cincin-
nati Law Review, vol., 83, 2014, p. 653 with further references.
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while institutional investors traditionally have been accountable to their bene-
ficiaries, SDR II’s provisions seem to hold this sub-group of investors account-
able to a wider range of stakeholders, including society. Moreover, post-SRD 
II disclosure provides stakeholders with information, which they might use to 
hold institutions accountable.
This line of reasoning leads directly to the argument that the amendment to 
the Shareholder Rights Directive takes a stronger stand on the obligation of at 
least a subset of the institutional investor population to become more actively 
involved in corporate governance. The Directive has introduced a new type 
of shareholder duty. This duty falls outside the framework by which we are 
able to explain most shareholder duties in company law or capital market law, 
as discussed above in Section 2.54 Rather, it could be argued that these duties 
are motivated by a post-crisis political agenda that includes increased trans-
parency between companies and investors, increased shareholder engagement 
to improve corporate governance practices and an increased focus on sustain-
ability and long-term commitment. Institutional investors have been identi-
fied as a group whose self-interest aligns closely with the latter two goals.55 
Compared with other investor groups, institutional investors are most likely to 
have engagement policies that further the political agenda that is embedded in 
SRD II.  Nonetheless, as the discussion below suggests, much stands between 
an emerging engagement duty as specified in SDR II and a transformation of 
corporate governance. 
4. ENGAGEMENT DUTIES – WHAT SHOULD WE EXPECT FROM 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS?
It is hard to predict the effect of SRD II requirements on either institutional 
investors or the companies in which they invest. As discussed in Section 2, 
principal-agent theory predicts that duties will be imposed on shareholders 
either to constrain their behavior or to enable other company constituents to 
control shareholders who are the agents of these constituents. However, SRD II 
duties do not aim to constrain the behavior of institutional investors in specific 
ways, but rather to change their general behavior. As discussed in the previous 
section, the aim is somewhat unclear and the provisions in Article 3g do not 
specify clearly what the expectations are. Still, it is clear that the overall aim is 
to institutional investors, further in their engagement with investee companies 
54 See Birkmose, H. S.: Duties Imposed on Specific Shareholders, op. cit. note 22, (forthcom-
ing).
55 See the 2011 Green Paper, (COM(2011) 164 final) section 2.1.
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in order to improve corporate governance practices.56 This new approach al-
lows us to consider the potential of shareholder duties to serve as a driver for a 
transformation of corporate governance in a more sustainable direction. Such 
a transformation, including corporate service of public interests, seems not to 
be far from the aim of the directive.
But what can we expect from shareholders, and especially from institutional 
investors? Are they going to embrace this more prominent role in corporate 
governance? Historically, shareholder engagement has been rather low in most 
Member States, which helps to explain why the Commission has taken a new 
approach with SRD II.57
The Commission has pointed out different reasons for the lack of engagement 
in the Green Papers preceding the Directive, such as conflicts of interest, costs 
of engagement and lack of sufficient shareholder rights.58 While each of these 
may contribute to a better understanding of past engagement levels, part of the 
reason may also be that the general position in company law is that institution-
al investors have a duty of loyalty only towards their beneficiaries, and even the 
extent of even this is debated.59 Traditionally, it seems, the European stand has 
been that this fiduciary duty does not oblige institutional investors to engage 
with investee companies.60 
Without a duty to engage or a duty of loyalty, shareholders could be expect-
ed first and foremost to use the rights they are given to protect their private 
interests in the company. Share ownership is very often an investment, and 
shareholders can be expected to engage to protect the value of this investment. 
Even though other private interests, including social or public objectives, may 
56 This is also found in relation to the development of the UK stewardship code, see Jennifer G. 
Hill, Images of the shareholder – shareholder power and shareholder powerlessness, in Hill, J. G. 
& Thomas, R. S. (eds.): Research Handbook on Shareholder Power, London, 2015, p. 65 f.
57 See the 2010 Green Paper, (COM(2010) 284 final), section 3.5, and the 2011 Green Paper, 
(COM(2011) 164 final) section 2.1. See also SRD II, recital 2.
58 In particular, the 2010 Green Paper, (COM(2010) 284 final), section 3.5.
59 See the contributions to Hawley, J. P. et.al (eds.): Cambridge Handbook of Institutional 
Investment and Fiduciary Duty, 2014.
60 See among others Barker, R. M. & Chiu, I. H.-Y.: Corporate Governance and Investment 
Management, London, 2017, pp. 63 ff. and 163 f. and Birkmose, H. S.: European Challenges 
op. cit. note 13, pp. 229 ff. However, the duty to vote is understood to be a fiduciary duty owed 
by some institutional investors to their beneficiaries in the US. See Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 29 US Code Chapter 18, Sections 1101–14. See also See also Rock, 
E. B.: Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in Gordon, J. N. & Ringe, W.-G.: The 
Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance, 2018, p. 375 ff. and Youngdahl, J.: The 
basis of fiduciary duty in investment in the United States, in Hawley, J. P. et.al (eds.): Cam-
bridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty, 2014, p. 22 ff.
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exist,61 the predominant theories expect financial interests to prevail. There-
fore, without legislation or other institutional incentives, we can expect share-
holders to act as drivers for transformation only to the extent that doing so 
will protect their financial interest in the company. Moreover, whether or not 
shareholders will remain passive or engage will partly depend on a cost benefit 
analysis, and the extent of engagement can be expected to correlate with its 
expected impact on the return on investment.62 The costs are primarily the cost 
of engagement,63 and the expected benefits will primarily occur in the form of 
increased company value as reflected in the share price.
SRD II expects institutional investors to make use of the rights they are grant-
ed by company law to ensure better corporate governance – not just to further 
their own interests in the company, but to further the interests of non-share-
holder groups as well. That is, SRD II intends to use institutional investors as a 
vehicle to promote corporate action on issues that are of concern to the wider 
public.64 Even if we assume that SRD II provides shareholders with sufficient 
incentives to engage, however, the presumption that their interests are aligned 
with the interests of other stakeholders or society might not survive a closer 
inspection. This is why shareholders in general may be imperfect agents for 
other company constituents or the general public.65 Moreover, because share-
holders are able to diversify their investments, they may be more risk tolerant 
than other company constituents.66 Finally, it is not at all clear that institutional 
61 Fairfax, L. M.: Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, op. cit. note 49, 
p. 82–85.
62 Daniëlle Melis, Leen Paape & Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers warn against loading institutional 
investors with too many burdens in Enforceability of institutional investors’ responsibilities 
in corporate governance through the Dutch Corporate Governance Code: are regulators and 
practitioners on the same page (and to who are institutional investors accountable)? Working 
Paper 2017, p. 22, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1975763. See also 
Rock, E. B.: Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in Gordon, J. N. & Ringe, W.-G.: 
The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance, 2018, p. 373 f.  
63 See Birkmose, H. S.: The transformation of passive institutional investors to active owners 
– mission impossible? in: Birkmose, H. S.: et al. (eds.), The European Financial Market in 
Transition, 2011, pp. 117 ff.
64 See also Fisch, J. E., The Mess at Morgan, op. cit. note 53, pp. 665 ff. See for a UK per-
spective Barker, R. M. & Chiu, I. H.-Y.: Corporate Governance and Investment Management, 
London, 2017, p 123 ff.
65 Fisch, J. E., The Mess at Morgan, op. cit. note 53, p. 668. See also Gerald Hertig, who ar-
gues in: Governance by Institutional Investors in a Stakeholder World’ that, of different groups 
of institutional investors, the interests of pension fund might be the closest to ‘ordinary’ other 
stakeholders’ interests, in: Gordon, J. N. & Ringe, W-G: The Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Law and Governance, Oxford, 2018, p. 836. 
66 Fisch, J. E., The Mess at Morgan, op. cit. note 53, p. 668.
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investors have the capacity to serve wider purposes: shareholdings in hundreds 
or even thousands of companies dilute their interest in any single company; 
they may lack sufficient information to monitor for example the social and en-
vironmental impact of their companies; and they may lack the resources need-
ed to gain such information, much less to include such factors meaningfully 
in their decision making. That is not to say, though, that shareholder interests 
are opposed to those of non-shareholders: if shareholders are too narrowly 
interested in short-term profit maximization and neglect a company’s social 
responsibility, it might negatively affect the cost of capital and, consequently, 
the value of the company.67 
It is therefore questionable whether the duties imposed by SRD II will be suf-
ficient to induce institutional investors to make significant changes to their 
engagement practices, and even more questionable whether institutional inves-
tors will embrace a more prominent in role that includes non-shareholder in-
terests.68 All of this said that the impact of SRD II may be significantly greater 
if the emerging engagement duties can be enforced efficiently. 
5. ENFORCEMENT OF SHAREHOLDER DUTIES
If we assume that neither shareholders in general nor institutional investors 
more specifically have strong incentives to take on a more prominent role in 
corporate governance and serve wider public interests, then a transformation 
of corporate governance in a more sustainable direction relies on whether or 
not the new disclosure duties can be efficiently enforced in a way that promotes 
the legislation’s intentions.69
As cited above, Article 3g states that Member States must ensure that institu-
tional investors and asset managers either disclose the information required by 
Article 3g paragraphs 2 and 3, or disclose why they have chosen not to comply 
with one or more of these requirements. In order to ensure not only the imple-
mentation of the provision but also its enforcement, Article 14b requires that 
Member States ‘shall lay down the rules on measures and penalties applicable 
to infringements of national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and 
67 Ribstein, L. E.: Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, Notre Dame 
Law Review, vol. 81, 2006, pp. 1444–5.
68 Others are less sceptical of the effect shareholders may have in relation to advancing stake-
holder issues. See Fairfax, L. M.: Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 
op. cit. note 49, p. 96.
69 The discussions in this section are based on Section XX of Birkmose, H. S.: Duties Im-
posed on Specific Shareholders, op. cit. note 22.
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shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented.’70 This 
means that Member States must ensure that institutional investors and asset 
managers comply with Article 3g’s comply or explain requirement. Public dis-
closure of institutional investors’ and asset managers’ investment strategies, 
their engagement policy and their implementation thereof might reduce the 
information advantage some shareholders have and could enable other compa-
ny constituents to act upon the disclosed information to safeguard their own 
interests.71 As such, here and in most agency contexts, disclosure is a means to 
an end: it allows principals to control their agents. Similarly, in relation to mar-
ket failure, disclosure should enable the market to include the information in 
the assessment of the potential market impact of various shareholder actions, 
which ought to ensure a more efficient market. 
While institutional investors are likely to comply with the formal disclosure 
requirements, this in itself might not lead to improved corporate governance in 
investee companies, or even to more shareholder engagement. Engagement by 
institutional investors can only have a positive impact on corporate governance 
if the individual institutional investor chooses to devote the resources needed 
to adopt and pursue a meaningful engagement policy.72 That is, if shareholder 
engagement is to have an impact beyond private shareholder interests, the en-
gagement policy and actual engagement should reflect the public dimension. 
None of this is required under SDR II, nor are Member States required to as-
sess the quality of the institutional investors’ engagement or the efficacy of the 
disclosed information. Thus, the disclosure might do nothing more than reflect 
status quo, which even could be: ‘our engagement policy is that we do not en-
gage.’ The question then becomes: who can or should ensure that institutional 
investors deliver more than a box-ticking exercise? If they choose to present a 
non-engagement policy, who – if anyone – ought to have the authority to com-
pel them both to engage in a meaningful way and disclose their engagement in 
an equally meaningful way?
In traditional corporate governance disclosure, the market is expected to in-
corporate the quality and the value of the disclosed corporate governance 
statements into the price of a listed company’s shares: market disappointment 
70 However, see Konstantinos Sergakis, who warns that the broad working of Article 14b may 
raise concerns about its applicability across the EU. Legal vs. Social Enforcement of Share-
holder Duties, in: Birkmose, H. S.: and Konstantinos Sergakis (eds.): Enforcing Shareholders’ 
Duties, Edward Elgar, 2018, (forthcoming).
71 Armour, J., Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R.: Agency Problems, op. cit. note 21,   p. 38 f.
72 See also the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, introduction to section 3, 
2015, where it is said that mandatory requirements to engage may be ineffective and could lead 
to a box-ticking approach.
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with the disclosed reports is reflected in a lower market value. Thus, the board 
of a listed company has an incentive to ensure the quality of its corporate gov-
ernance reporting.73 Applied to SDR II mandated disclosures by institution-
al investors, it is doubtful that market pressure will sanction poor disclosure 
practices. First, it is not clear, who ‘the market’ is. Institutional investors need 
not be listed on a stock exchange, even though the SRD II preamble states 
that disclosure could have a positive impact on investor awareness. Moreover, 
it is not obvious that ‘investor awareness’ refers to those who invest their re-
sources with institutional investors’. The phrase could equally well be meant 
to describe minority investors in the same companies. The latter have limited 
means to put pressure on the institutional investors beyond choosing to disin-
vest. Even that might not always be possible. Market pressure might also come 
from the institutional investors’ beneficiaries, and the SRD II drafters might 
expect such pressure, as the preamble states that disclosure should enable ulti-
mate beneficiaries such as future pensioners to optimize their investment de-
cisions. And yet, even when beneficiaries pay attention to their pension fund, 
etc., they virtually never have the means to put pressure on their institutional 
agents,74 because, as with minority shareholders, they face a massive collective 
action problem. Dialogue between institutional investors and investee com-
panies is also mentioned in the preamble, and even though the boards in list-
ed companies may have an interest in their investors’ preferences, they lack 
means to put pressure on their institutional investors. Finally, accountability to 
society is mentioned, but society has been given no rights to sanction beyond 
the formal enforcement of disclosure. However, interest groups may be able to 
put some pressure on institutional investors, by ‘naming and shaming’ those 
whose engagement they consider inefficient or suboptimal.75 The existence 
and effect of such strategies could be the subject of future empirical research. 
Relevant theoretical frameworks offer little insight regarding what we might 
expect. 
In short, the enforcement provisions included in SRD II may ensure black-let-
ter disclosure, but there no immediate mechanism for ensuring that legal dis-
closures advance the underlying aims of the engagement provisions. Howev-
73 Evidence shows that the mechanism of comply or explain does not function perfectly. See 
Risk Metrics, Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in 
the Member States, p. 13, 2009.
74 See Melis, Paape & Lückerath-Rovers: Enforceability of institutional investors’ responsi-
bilities, op. cit. note 61.
75 Informal enforcement strategies, such as ‘naming and shaming’, via the disclosure not 
only of the violations themselves (e.g. public warning) is also available to national authorities 
enforcing disclosure. See, Sergakis, K., Legal vs. Social Enforcement, op. cit., note 69, (forth-
coming).
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er, the absence of acceptable results might lead regulators to intervene later, 
which places investors in a conundrum familiar in a variety of contexts: a 
future choice between more engagement and more regulation.76 
6.  SHAREHOLDER DUTIES AS A DRIVER FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
TRANSFORMATION?
As discussed above, the shareholder duties found in SRD II can be seen as part 
of an emerging corporate governance agenda. Rather than limiting the actions 
of shareholders, the duties aim to extend shareholder actions, that is, to pro-
mote behavior that supports a political agenda. As we see it, shareholder duties 
can be part of a transformation of corporate governance practices in either 
of two ways: the transformation could be initiated by the company, whereby 
the board of directors proactively includes public interests even in situations 
where these are not aligned with the shareholder (short-term) interest in creat-
ing wealth; or it could be initiated by shareholders who use their shareholder 
rights to urge corporate behavior that is consistent with public interests, most 
especially as related to long-term sustainability. 
Shareholders were not the only possible target of legislation intended to trans-
form company practices in a more sustainable direction. It might have been 
more natural to look at the board of directors, which has the power to make 
most corporate decisions.77 Looking forward, legislators might still do so. If, in 
the future, they impose duties on the board to include certain public interests 
in their decisions, then shareholders could use their rights to monitor the per-
formance of the board of directors, in particular if management has to report 
on compliance. But unless new legislative initiatives clearly describe the board 
of directors’ duties in that respect, it seems unlikely that shareholders will use 
their rights to push for a transformation that serves public interests which are 
not clearly aligned with their private interests. 
Returning to Article 3, institutional investors’ engagement policies are ex-
pected to explain how they ‘monitor investee companies on relevant matters, 
including strategy, financial and non-financial performance and risk, capital 
structure, social and environmental impact and corporate governance’. How-
ever, the obligations the board of directors assumes regarding the social and 
76 Melis, Paape & Lückerath-Rovers: Enforceability of institutional investors’ responsibili-
ties, op. cit. note 61. 
77 The limits to managements’ right to decide differ among individual Member States. See for 
instance Andenas, M. & Wooldridge, F.: European Comparative Company Law, Cambridge, 
2009, Chapter 6; or Van Hulle, K. & Gesell, H. (eds.), European Corporate Law, Nomos, 2006.
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environmental impact of the company they manage may depend on hard law 
as well as soft law, so a new duty of institutional investors to include such per-
spectives in their control practices might not result in improved practices on 
the matter,. Moreover, it has been shown in a US context, that even when duties 
are imposed on the board of directors, shareholder engagement might not be an 
efficient way to secure a change in practices.78
As an alternative to imposing duties on the board of directors, shareholders 
could take on a responsibility beyond the agency relationship between the 
board of directors and shareholders and include public interests in their own 
proactive agenda. However, the role of shareholders in corporate governance 
is formally limited to the general meeting, which may limit the shareholders’ 
room for maneuver. Their authority at the general meeting depends primarily 
on the rights they are given in company law. Arguably, these rights first and 
foremost enable shareholders to monitor the board of directors and to protect 
their interests in the company. Whether or not shareholders are able to initiate 
any transformation of company practices depends on the rights given under 
national company law. In some Member States, shareholder rights are restrict-
ed to monitoring the board of directors, while in other jurisdictions sharehold-
ers may initiate transformations and obligate the board to carry out decisions 
taken at the general meeting.79 But even if shareholders are able to initiate 
changes, shareholder-initiated transformations can be expected to take place 
in only a few situations. Shareholders can be expected to use the rights they 
are given primarily to protect their interests in the company, and a transforma-
tion is unlikely to take place unless the public aim is aligned with shareholder 
interests. 
Finally, legislators may choose to impose duties on shareholders intended to 
transform company practices in a more sustainable direction. However, a pro-
cess that is politically driven from above and crafted without adequate sensitiv-
ity to countervailing institutional incentives might not have the desired effect. 
Moreover, any legislative initiatives that require shareholders to be proactive 
should be within the limits of their authority at the general meetings, and the 
power to manage the company should remain with the board of directors.80 
78 Fisch, J. E., The Mess at Morgan, op. cit. note 53, pp. 669 ff., in relation to the advisory 
shareholder vote on say-on-pay in the US, which was enacted with the Dodd-Frank Act.
79 See Hansen, J. L.: The Role of Shareholders in Public Companies in the Nordic Countries, 
pp. 83 ff. and Kersting, C.: The Role of Shareholders in Public Companies in Germany, pp. 112 
ff., both in: Fleischer, H., Hansen, J.  L. & Ringe, W-G (eds.): German and Nordic Perspectives 
on Company Law and Capital Markets Law, Tübingen 2015. See also Lekvall, P. (ed.): The 
Nordic Corporate Governance Model, Stockholm, 2014, pp. 58 ff. 
80 See Lekvall, ibid, pp. 69 ff.
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While legislators have the power to impose duties on shareholders to promote 
a desired practice by shareholders, the discussion above on the expected effect 
of the SRD II shows that the imposition of these new duties might not be suf-
ficient to secure the desired transformation. Outside the agency relationships 
in companies, it is important that the model regulators choose is backed by 
efficient enforcement, as shareholders lack sufficient incentives to fulfill their 
engagement duties without proper enforcement. This feature is lacking in the 
SRD II disclosure model, as discussed above. 
Consequently, if shareholder duties are to become an effective means to se-
cure a desired transformation of corporate governance, we need to consider 
whether private or public enforcement is preferred. When we move outside the 
agency relationship, it is essential that legislators identify groups that already 
have an incentive to enforce shareholder duties, and provide these groups with 
appropriate means to do so. If we rely on private enforcement, then we have to 
consider who will benefit the most from compliance and is therefore willing 
to carry the costs connected with enforcement. Public enforcement may also 
be an option, giving for instance national financial supervisory authorities the 
power to enforce and sanction non-compliance.81 While the sanctions may dif-
fer depending on whether the duties are to be enforced by private parties (for 
instance by taking the non-compliant shareholders to court) or public parties 
(using pecuniary or criminal sanctions), it is a fundamental prerequisite that 
the duties imposed on shareholders are clear and unambiguous, in order for 
the enforcing party to be able to assess whether or not the shareholders have 
complied. Moreover, it is essential that the shareholders know what to do to be 
in compliance with the given duties. 
Besides the enforcement issue, the scope of any additional shareholder duties 
should be considered carefully. If new duties are imposed on shareholders in 
order to promote a political agenda that does not originate in agency relations 
or market failure concerns, a number of questions should be carefully con-
sidered. For one, as mentioned above in Section 4, it is questionable whether 
‘third party interests’ are best protected by shareholder duties, as shareholder 
interests cannot be expected always to be aligned with the interests of other 
company constituents or the wider public. If legislators find that efficiently 
enforced duties can improve the alignment of shareholder interests with other 
parties’ interests, then legislators need also to consider the costs that share-
holders have to carry when such duties are imposed on them.82 Furthermore, 
the costs need to be balanced against the interests the duties are intended to 
81 See Konstantinos Sergakis, who warns against legal sanctions of the emerging engagement 
duties in: Legal vs. Social Enforcement, op. cit., note 69, (forthcoming). 
82 See Melis, Paape & Lückerath-Rovers: Enforceability of institutional investors’ responsi-
bilities, op. cit. note 61.
Intereulaweast, Vol. V (2) 2018
92
serve, and it must be assessed whether the duties are suited to protect the po-
litically defined interests and whether the need to protect these interests are of 
greater value than the costs imposed on the shareholders. Legislators need also 
consider whether duties should be imposed on all shareholders, or a subset of 
shareholders. If the latter, legislators need to consider whether shareholders of 
certain types, such as institutional investors, should be imposed duties, or if 
a universal criterion like shareholding size should trigger the duties.83 Finally, 
legislators need to consider whether duties should be imposed on shareholders 
in all types of companies or only on shareholders that invest in larger compa-
nies or in listed companies. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
Imposing duties on shareholders can be seen as a transformative intervention 
in the private ordering of parties in a company. While such a legislative inter-
vention might serve purposes traditionally seen as legitimate, such as protect-
ing the interests of the principal in an agency relationship or ensuring market 
efficiency in case of concerns of market failure, duties can also serve other 
aims and SRD II explicitly does so. Duties like those mandated in SRD II 
are intended to be vehicles that support non-market-driven transformations of 
corporate governance. This is why legislators turn to other means to promote 
such transformations. Moreover, legislators may push for a transformation that 
is intended to serve a wider aim than to protect the interests of the shareholder, 
including public interests. SRD II has been discussed as an example of legisla-
tive attempts to promote a specific corporate governance agenda by the use of 
duties. In this article, I have argued that, in practice, SRD II duties might not 
bring about any significant changes to the institutional investors’ engagement 
practices, partly due to an inefficient enforcement mechanism. If shareholder 
duties are to serve as a vehicle for a sustainable transformation of governance 
practices, legislators have to consider not only how to enforce the duties effi-
ciently, but also whether this purpose truly justifies their intervention in com-
panies’ private ordering. 
While shareholder duties can serve as a vehicle for transformation of company 
law and corporate governance in certain situations, the effect of shareholder 
duties arguably has clear limits. Therefore, should legislators decide to pro-
ceed down the path they started upon with SRD II, they should consider care-
fully in which situations shareholders duties will have the desired effect.  
83 A number of the corporate governance duties we find in company law and capital market 
law depend on size, as large shareholders have to potential to exercise influence over a compa-
ny, see Sørensen, K. E.: Shareholders’ Duty to Disclose, op. cit. note 31, pp. 311 ff. 
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